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When the insured arranges to pay his premiums through an agent, four things
may occur:
(1) The insured pays the agent and the agent pays the company.
(2) The insured pays the agent and the agent does not pay the company.
(3) The insured does not pay the agent, but nevertheless the agent pays
the company.
(4) The insured does not pay the agent, and the agent does not pay the com-
pany.
Where the insured pays the agent and the agent pays the company, it is every-
where admitted that th-e premium is sufficiently paid, and the company cannot
plead non-payment. The purpose of this article is to treat the last three fact situa-
tions.
No case will be considered as an authority on any of these fact situations
unless the fact situation in question actually is present in the case, or unless the
dicta in the case clearly intends to express an opinion on the fact situation.
Definitions
Throughout this article the three words "company," "agent," and "insured"
will occur. The word "company" will mean the home office of the insurance com-
pany, or such person as is specifically designated by the language of the insurance
policy to receive the premium (all the conditions necessary to his authority as set
forth in the policy, having been met); thus payment to a general or countersigning
agent of the company will be spoken of as payment to the "company." In other
words, payment to the "company" is such payment as the policy expressly permits.
"Agent" will mean any intermediary between the company as above defined
and the insured; thus the agent of a general agent, a sub-agent of the company, and
an insurance broker, are all "agents" as defined herein. The "insured" is the per-
son who is insured, or who is acting as his agent in the matter of insurance.
Relevant Clauses in Standard Insurance Policies
What constitutes payment to the company is nevr left to the general rules of
agency to decide; every insurance policy sets forth some conditions relating to pay-
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ment. Usually most policies contain three clauses elating to the power of an agent
to receive payment of the premium. For the sake of brevity we shall speak of these
clauses as:
(1) The prepayment clause,
(2) The lapse clause, and
(3) The no-waiver clause.
The prepayment clause usually provides that the insurance shall not be ef-
fective until payment is made to an officer of the company, or to an agent duly
authorized in writing (the "general agent"), and countersigned by the person re-
ceiving the premium, and until the policy is delivered to the insured and a receipt
is issued therefor. 1 The lapse clause provides that the policy shall lapse upon non-
payment of premiums. 2 The no-waiver clause provides that no agent shall have
any power to waive or alter any conditions of the policy and is accompanied by
a clause that all conditions of the policy are contained therein,3 thus invoking the
full force of the parol evidence rule against any oral understandings that the in-
sured may have with the agent as to payment; even written understandings are
made of no effect unless approved by the company in writing.
Relevant Statutes in Pennsylvania
The law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania prohibits illegal inducements
for the purchase of insurance; thus overly-favorable arrangements made with the
agent in regard to payment are prohibited and the company may be able to defend
against the insured on this basis. Also, the law requires that all policies of life
1 This clause in the standard form life insurance policy of the Penn Mutual Life Insurance
Company reads:
This contract is made in consideration of the payment to the Company of premiums as provided
in this section, and shall not be effective until this policy has been delivered and the first prkmium
paid."
2 This clause in the standard form life insurance policy of the Penn Mutual Lite Insurance
Company Reads:
"This policy shall lapse upon failure to pay a premium in default within the grace period, and shall
terminate immediately upon lapse except as hereinafter provided in Section 6."
Section 6 provides for automatic premium loans out of the cash value of the policy.
3 This clause in the standard form life insurance policy of the Penn Mutual Life Insurance
Company reads:
"No modification or alteration of this policy, or waiver of any of its conditions shall be valid
unless endorsed hereon, and signed by an officer of this Company. No agent is authorized to modi-
fy, alter or enlarge this contract, or to bind the company by any promise or undertaking as to
distribution of surplus or future award of interest."
The policy also contains the usual exclusion clause:
"This policy and the application therefor, a copy of which is attached hereto, constitute the entire
contract between the parties."
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insurance contain a clause requiring prepayment of the initial premium and pro-
viding for the lapse of the policy after a thirty-day grace period. 4
WHERE THE INSURED PAYS THE AGENT BUT THE AGENT
DOES NOT PAY THE COMPANY
Two Theories: Possession and Credit
Two theories have been advanced in the cases as to when the insured is auth-
orized by the company to pay the premium to the agent. The first theory we shall
call the "possession" theory; the second we shall call the "credit" theory. The ele-
ments necessary to establish the authority of the insured to pay the agent under
the possession theory are:
(1) There is payment of cash or check honored
(2) to the person in possession of the policy
(3) who has obtained his possession of the policy with the consent of the
company
(4) for the purpose of delivering the policy and receiving the premium,
(5) and the payment is made by reason of reliance by the insured upon the
possession of the policy in the agent,
4 Illegal inducements-Act of 1921 P. L. 7S9, 816, sees., 635, 636 40 P. S. 275.
"Section 635. Rebates and Inducements Prohibited. No insurance agent, solicitor, or broker,
personally or by any other party, shall offer, promise, allow, give, set off, or pay, directly or in-
directly, any rebate of, or part of, the premium payable on the policy or on any policy or agent's
commission thereon, or earnings, profit, dividends, or other benefit founded, arising, accruing, or
to accrue thereon or therefrom, or any special advantage in date of policy or age of issue or any
paid employment or contract for services of any kind, or any other valuable consideration or induce-
ment, to or for insurance on any risk in this Commonwealth, now or hereafter to be written, which
is not specified in the policy contract of insurance; nor shall such agent, solicitor, or broker, person-
ally or otherwise, offer, promise, give, option, sell or purchase any stocks, bonds, securities, or proper-
ty, or any dividends or profits accruing thereon, or other thing of value whatsoever, as induce-
ment to insuiance or in connection therewith, Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent
the taking of bona fide obligation, with legal interest, in payment of any premium,
"Secion 636. Insured Persons and Applicants fo, Insurance Prohibed from Accepting Re-
hates. No insured person er partt or applicant for insurance, shall, direcly or indirectly, receive
or accept, Ior agree to receive or accept, any rebate or premium, or any part-thereof, or all or any
part of any a ,rr a, solicitor's, or broker's commission thereon, or any favor or advantage, or share
in any benefit to accrue under any policy of insurance, or any valuable consideration or inducement,
other than such as are specified in the policy."
The Prcpayment Statute: Act of 1945, P. L. 334, sec. 1 (sec. 410) (a) of the insurance regulation
law:
"Section 410. Uniform Policy Provisions. No policy of life or endowment insurance, except
policies of industrial insurance where the premiums are payable monthly or oftener, shall hereafter be
issued or delivered by a stock or mutual life insurance company in this Commonwealth unless it
contains, in substance, the following provisions:
(a). A provision that all premiums shall be payable in advance, either at the home office
of the company or to an agent of the company, upon delivery of a receipt signed by one or more of
the officers of the company who shall be named in the policy."
This statute was originaly passed in the Act of 1911, P. L. 581, sec. 25, and reenacted as section
410 of the insurance regulation act by Act of 1921, P. L. 682, Act of 1935 P. L. 1020 and Act of 1937,
P. L. 1634; it is also given in 40 P. S. 510.
The clause providing for the thirty-day grace period is given in note 53, infra.
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(6) and this reliance is shown by actual delivery of the policy to the insured
by the agent.
Elements numbers 3, 4 and 6 may not be required.
The elements of the credit theory are similar:
(1) There is payment of cash or check honored,
(2) to the person who has received credit from the company,
(3) who has received his credit from the company for the purpose of re-
ceiving payment from the insured,
(4) and the payment is made by reason of reliance by the insured upon the
extension of credit by the company to the agent.
Element number 3 may not be necessary.
When the elements of either theory are met, the payment to the agent will
be payment to the company without regard to any of the written provisions of the
policy. This conclusion has been reached largely without an explicit consideration
of the parol evidence rule, but rather as the sense of justice by the courts was moved
according to the facts of each case.
Distinction Between Cases Involving Initial and Subsequent Premium
When the initial premium is paid to the agent, the agent, if he has possession
of the policy, usually delivers the policy to the insured, and the conclusiveness
of the payment can be sustained under the possession theory. But when subsequent
premiums are made to the agent, he may possess nothing to deliver to the insured;
in fact, it has been held that the absence of a receipt is probative of the fact that
the premium was not paid., If, however, the agent possesses the premium receipt,
then the facts in legal significance are identical to the situation where the delivery
of the policy accompanies the payment of the initial premium. If, however, the
agent gives the insured nothing except his personal receipt, then the payment
must be sustained if at all under the credit theory. Of course, it is an unusual situa-
tion where there is not either a policy or a premium receipt delivered in return for
the premium. In cases like life insurance where new policies are not issued, a pre-
mium receipt is issued; in cases like accident insurance, it is customary to issue new
policies at the beginning of every premium period.
Possession Theory: General
The clearest expression of the possession theory is given by Mr. Justice Dean
in the case of Arthurhold v. Fire Insurance Co. :6
6 Roseberry v. Insurance Company, 120 Pa. Super. 450, 183 A. 121 (1936).
6 159 Pa. 1, 8, 28 A. 197, 39 Am. St. Rep. 659 (1894).
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"It ought to be held that, under such a clause (the prepayment clause),
the insurers themselves waive it, whenever, by their voluntary act, the
policy leaves the office to be delivered to the insured on payment of the
premium. By the very fact of issuing a policy which requires, apparently,
nothing but delivery and payment of premium to put it in force, the com-
pany arms every man into whose hands it may come with the power to
receive its money; there could be no conduct more significant of an
intention to waive an advantage of such a clause as this."
Although the possession theory has not always been expressed in these terms,
among a long line of cases7 there have been only three or four cases which have
refused to give the theory general approval. 8
The case of Pottsville Insurance Co. v. Improvement Co.0 has been a hindrance
to an unhesitating assertion of the possession theory. In that case, fire insurance
was taken through a chain of several intermediary brokers. Payment had reached
the third broker before the loss, but it did not get either to the hom'e office or to
a general agent of the company. The policy, however, was delivered to the insured
by his immediate broker at the same time he received payment. The result is not
very equitable; the insured does what the insurance company invites him to do,
pay the person in possession, and then because the transmitters are slow or dishon-
est, there is no insurance. Consequently, the cases have avoided the precedent;
7 Pennsylvania Insurance Company v. Carter, 8 Sad. 191 (Pa. 1887); Arthurhold v. In-
surance Company 159 Pa. 1, 28 A. 197, 39 Am. St. Rep. 59 (1894); Walker v. Insurance Com-
pany, 175 Pa. 345 (1896) ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Peoples, 26 Pa. Super. 142 (1904) ; Ellis
v. Anderson, 49 Pa. Super. 245 (1912), reversing 20 Dist. 485 and 38 Co. Ct. 657; Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Clark, 62 Pa. Super. 528 (1916); Peretzman v. Insurance Company, 258 Pa. 319, 102 A.
22; Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Atlas Assurance Company, 278 Pa. 558, 123 A. 497; Pennsylvania
Co. (Insurance) v. Home Life Insurance Company, 295 Pa. 286, 145 A. 286 (1927); Letvin v.
Insurance Company, 91 Pa. Super. 422 (1927); Krebs v. Tomlinson, 12 D. & C. 126 (1929) ; Isaac
v. Insurance Company, 308 Pa. 439, 444, 162 A. 300 (1932); Simpson v. Assurance Society, 127
Pa. Super. 386, 193 A. 449 (1937) ; Pearl Assurance Company v. National Insurance Agency, 150
Pa. Super. 265, 28 A.2d 334, (1942); Standard Freight Company v. Insurance Company, 157 Pa.
Super. 484, 43 A.2d 620 (1945).
8 Pottsville Insurance Co. v. Improvement Co., 100 Pa. 137 (1882) ; Flynn v. Insurance Co.,
4 Pa. Super. 137 (1897). Possibly also Landy v. Insurance Co., 78 Pa. Super. 47 (1921) and Scott
v. Sun Fire Office, 133 Pa. 322 (1890).
9 100 Pa. 137 (1882).
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first by distinguishing the case, 10 and later by repudiation. 1 Only in thL most
recent cases have the courts ceased to consider it.
The decision next following the Pottsville case was Universal Insmrance Co.
v. Block. 12 There the court approved the doctrine of the Pottsville case, but held
that the company had been constructively paid, because the payment had reached
the hands of one who had been given credit by a general agent of the company at
the time of the loss.
It is difficult to determine from the decision of Flynn v. Insurance Co.,"s
whether the court intended to repudiate the possession theory or whether the court
10 Universal Insurance Company v. Block, 109 Pa. 535, 1 A. 523 (1885); Riley v. Insurance
Co., 110 Pa. 144, 1 A. 528 (1885); Lebanon Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Erb, 112 Pa. 149, 4 A. 8,
(1886) ; Elkins v. Insurance Co., 124 Pa. 484, 17 A. 24, 10 A. L. R. 608 (1889).
"We may agree that the result would have been different had Heller, who was the immediate
agent of the plaintiff (insured), neglected to pay over the premium to Anderson or Huntzinger
(agents of the company), for then the case has some resemblance to that of Pottsville Insur-
ance Co. v. Improvement Co., 100 Pa. 137, for in that case the plaintiff's agent would have been
chargeable with neglect which could not have been attributed to the company." Universal Insur-
ance Co. v. Block, supra.
"We have therefore but to add that the attempt to sustain the judgment of the court below
by the case of Pottsville Insurance Co. v. Improvement Co., 100 Pa. 137, is a failure. The two
cases are as wide apart as the poles. In that case the policy passed from the hands of the agent
through no less than three brokers before it reached the insured; he did not pay the premium until
after he had received the policy, and the money was never paid to the company nor its agent. More
than this, the company refused to risk, and the agent, in vain, tried to recall the policy. It will thus
be seen that the two cases are entirely dissimilar, and the one cannot by any ingenuity, be made to
govern the other." Riley v. Insurance Co., supra.
Lebanon Mutual Fire Insuranre Co. v. Erb, supra, was distinguished from Pottsville Insurance
Co. v. Improvement Co., because the former case did not contain the clauses requiring
payment of the premium "into the office of the company" and a no-waiver-by-any-agent clause.
"This case is readily distinguishable from Pottsville Insurance Co. v. Improvement Co.
In each of these cases the company was resting upon the positive provision of the policy, that
it was not binding until actual payment of the premium. . . . In this case, however, the agency
of Crane (the agent) was established by proofs satisfactory to the jury, and there was evidence from
which the jury was justified in inferring that the company authorized the delivery of the policy and
accepted the responsibility of their agent in lieu of the security afforded by this provision of the
policy." Elkins v. Insurance Co., supra.
11 Mr. Justice Dean both distinguishes and repudiates Pottsville Insurance Co. v. Improve-
ment Co., supra, in Arthurhold v. Fire Insurance Co., 159 Pa. 1, 28 A. 197, 29 A. L R. 659 (1894).
The distinction: "The cases cited by appellant as holding a different rule are without doubt
the law, but they are clearly distinguishable on their facts from the one before us. In Pottsville In-
surance Co. v. Improvement Co., 100 Pa. 137 . ... . our brother Green puts the decision ex-
pressly on the ground that the insured had paid the premium to a broker he knew was not the agent
of the company, and therefore took the risk." (page 5)
The repudiation: "It ought to be held that, under such a clause, the insurers themselves waive
it, whenever, by their voluntary act, the policy leaves the office to be delivered to the insured
on payment of the premium. By the very fact of issuing a policy which requires, apparently, nothing
but delivery and payment of premium to put it in force, the company arms every person into whose
bands it may come with the power to receive its money; there could be no conduct more significant
of an intention to waive the advantage of such a clause as this." (Italics mine) (page 9).
The only shred left of Potiville Insurance Co. v. Improvement Co., supra, is a payment to a
person in possession of the policy whom the insured actually knows came into possession of the
policy without the consent of the company.
The Pottsville case is also observed by the court to be without authority in: Transcontinental
Oil Co. v. Assurance Co., 278 Pa. 558, 564, 123 A. (1924); and Letvin v. Insurance Co. 91
Pa. Super. 422, 425 (1927).
12 109 Pa. 535, 1 A. 523 (1885).
1 4 Pa. Super. 137 (1897).
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intended its decision to rest on narrower grounds, namely, that he who delivered
was not an agent of the company, but only an agent of the agent, and that he was
not in fact authorized to deliver (not receiving the premium therefor) and that
the agent of the company did not assert he had the right to receive, but said he
"would see what he could do." In that case the insured after much delay took de-
livery of the policy from a sub-agent, and paid the agent, on the same day his
horse died. The insured's haste to insure on the day the horse took ill, we may be
sure, did not recommend his case to the consideration of the court.
In Peretzman v. Insurance Co.14 the court approved the possession theory,
and held that it did not apply to the facts of that case because the insured delayed
too long in paying the agent (who did not remit) and perhaps also because the
insured did not protest seasonably the company's notice of cancellation (which ap-
peared in the facts but was not given as a reason for the decision). It is interesting
to observe that on almost identical facts excepting the delay of the insured, the
court in Gosch v. Fireman's Insurance Co.'8 came to the opposite conclusion. It
remains as a reflection on the scholarship of our courts that the Gosch case was not
cited in the opinion of the Peretzman case.
May the Insurance Broker Be the Agent of the Insured To Obtain Insurance
and the Agent of the Company To Receive the Premium?
It has been held many times that the insurance broker may be the agent of
the insured to obtain the insurance and the agent of the company to receive the
premium. 16 Hence fraudulent statements made by the broker to the company in
the procurement of the insurance are attributed to the insured. 17 But likewise, the
fraud of the broker on the insured in executing the acts of the company will be
attributed to the company.18
Possession Theory: Must the Agent be in Fact Authorized To Receive the Premium
and Deliver the Policy?
There is some indication in the earlier cases that the agent must in fact have
an oral authorization from the company to deliver the policy and receive the pre-
mium (although it is true that the showing of such oral authorization will set aside
the parol evidence rule to contradict the denial of such authority in the language
14 258 Pa. 319, 102 A. 22 (1917).
15 33 Pa. Super. 496 (1907).
16 Marland v. Insurance Co., 71 Pa. 393 (1872); Riley v. Insurance Co., 110 Pa. 144, 1 A.
528 (1885) ; Lebanon Mutual Insurance Co., v. Hoover, 113 Pa. 591, 8 A. 163 (1886) ; Annotation
of Sadler of Pennsylvania Insurance Co. v. Carter, 8 Sad. 191 (Pa. 1887) ; Freedman v. Insurance
Co., 182 Pa. 64, 37 A. 909 (1897); Sargeant v. Insurance Co., 189 Pa. 341, 41 A. 351 (1899) ; Bate-
man v. Insurance Co., 189 Pa. 465, 42 A. 184 (1899) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peoples, 26 Pa.
Super. 142 (1904); Clymer Opera Co. v. Insurance Co., 50 Pa. Super. 639 (1912); Harrisburg
Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 278 Pa. 255, 122 A. 292 (1923 ) ; Transcontinental Oil Co. v.
Atlas Assurance Co., 278 Pa. 558, 123 A. 497 (1924).
17 Freedman v. Insurance Co., 182 Pa. 64, 37 A. 909 (1897) ; Bateman v. Insurance Co., 189
Pa. 465, 43 A. 184 (1899) ; Clymer Opera Co. v. Insurance Co., 50 Pa. Super. 639 (1912).
18 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peoples, 26 Pa. Super. 142 (1904).
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of the policy), but the better conclusion from tht cases is that actual authority is not
required. 19 However, those cases which have indicated that such authority is not
necessary2° have seen fit to rule upon questions assuming that actual authority is
necessary. Thus we have rulings that evidence is admissible on the question of
actual authority. 2'1 Or that proof of actual oral authority is sufficient to establish
the effectiveness of the payment.22 There are rulings that the possession of the
policy by the agent creates a presumption that the agent has authority to receive, 2
8
although this presumption was denied in the first case which ruled upon it,24 but not
thereafter. The authority to receive is, of course, a fortiori, when the policy in
the possession of the agent contains an acknowledgement of the payment of pre-
mium.
26
Corollary to the question as to whether the agent must have actual oral auth-
ority to receive the premium, is the question whether the person who receives
the premium from the insured must be an agent for the company for some other
purpose than merely to receive that one particular premium and deliver that one
particular policy. Perhaps the problem is really evidential; that is, unless th'e
agency is more than singular in nature, there can be no presumption of authority
to receive the premium in the absence of clear proof of actual authority to do so.
The problem, however, has never been stated as an evidential one, but as an abso-
lute requirement, and it has been answered in the affirmative several times that
the person who receives must have some other agency from the company than to
receive that one premium and to deliver that one policy. 26 But despite the holdings
or intimations in these cases, this writer believes that such broad authority in the
19 Arthurhold v. Insurance Co., 159 Pa. 1, 8, 28 A. 197, 39 Am. St. Rep. 659 (1894) ; Es-
sington Enamel Co. v. Insurance Co., 45 Pa. Super. 550 (1911). It is sufficient: Pennsylvania Co.,
etc., v. Home Life Ins. Co., 295 Pa. 286, 145 A. 286 (1927). It is required: Riley v. Insurance
Co., 110 Pa. 144, 1 A. 52R (1885); Walker v. Insurance Co., 175 Pa. 345, 34 A. 746 (1896);
Flynn v. Insurance Co., 4 Pa. Super. 137 (1897); Standard Freight Co. v. Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super.
484, 43 A.2d 620 (1945). Possibly al;o required by Letvin v. Insurance Co., 91 Pa. Super. 422
(1927). Many of these cases moderate the rule by presuming such authority from the possession of
the agent. See note 23, infra,
20 See note 19, supra.
21 Arthurhold v. Ins. Co., 159 Pa. 1, 28 A. 197, 39 Am. St. Rep. 659 (1894).
22 Pennsylvania Co., etc., v. Home Life Ins. Co., 295 Pa. 286, 145 A. 286 (1927).
23 Walker v. Ins. Co., 175 Pa. 345, 34 A. 746 (1896) ; Letvin v. Ins. Co., 91 Pa. Super. 422
(1927); Standard Freight Co. v. Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 484, 43 A.2d 620 (1945). Possibly also
Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co., v. Erb, 112 Pa. 149, 4 A. 8 (1886); Peretzman v. Ins. Co., 258 Pa.
319, 120 A. 22 (1917) (dicta).
24 Block v. Insurance Company, 109 Pa. 535, 1 A. 523 (1885).
26 Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co. v. Erb, 112 Pa. 149, 4 A. 8 (1886). It is difficult to tell to
what extent later cases relied on the acknowledgement of the premium in their reasoning, as they
do not mention it, but cite the Lebanon v. Erb case which does. See cases note 23, supra; also Gosch v.
Ins. Co., 33 Pa. Super. 496 (1907).
26 Pottsville Ins. Co. v. Minnequa Improvement Co., 100 Pa. 137 (1882) ; Flynn v. Ins. Co.,
4 Pa. Super. 137 (1897). Possibly Standard Freight v. Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 484, 43 A.2d
620 (1945). Evidence of agency admissible on question of authority: Arthurhold v. Ins. Co., 159
Pa. 1, 28 A. 197, 39 Am. St. Rep. 659 (1894). Possession plus general agency is sufficient proof of
authority to receive premium: Peretzman v. Ins. Co., 258 Pa. 319, 102 A. 22 (1917) (dicta).
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agent is not necessary, and that it is considered by the courts recently, where not
denied,261 only out of an adundance of caution.
27
Possession Theory: Delivery
There has been some suggestion in two cases that the policy must be physically
delivered to the insured,281 but the insistence of these Auggestions is so slight that
it cannot be said there is any authority for this requirement. Flynn v. Insurance Co.,
supra, however, might be said to stand for the proposition that the insured must pay
upon the reliance of the possession of the agent as the authority of the agent to re-
ceive the premium.29 It is unnecessary to add that the delivery of a policy and the
payment of the premium is conditional upon the money being genuine or the check
honored when presented.80
Possession Theory: Legality
It has been held that the authority of an agent to receive the payment of an
26a Arthurhold v. Ins. Co., 159 Pa. 1, 28 A. 197, 39 Am. St. Rep. 659 (1894); Letvin v. Ins.
Co., 91 Pa. Super. 422 (1927).
27 According to the rule announced in Arthurhold v. 'Ins. Co., this is not necessary.
Sadler in his annotation of Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Carter, 8 Sad. 191, indicates that the person who
is paid must be an agent of the insurance company for other purposes than to deliver the particular
policy in suit and to collect the premium on it, relying on the authority of Pottsville Ins. Co. v.
Improvement Co., 100 Pa. 137, and Flynn v. Ins. Co., 4 Pa. Super. 137. While it seems probable
to this writer that those cases did not intend to announce that theory (although those were the
facts of the cases), the reasoning behind Sad!er's views is that mere possession of the policy does
not create an apparent agency to deliver and collect. Hence, Sadler suggests a reconciliation of the
cases by suggesting that possession plus general agency does create an apparent agency to deliver
and collect. Universal Ins. Co. v. Block, 109 Pa. 535, could also be reconciled to this point of
view; for in that case, the general agent may be said to have received the premium because one to
whom lie had granted credit had received the premium. Likewise this view finds more explicit sup-
port in Riley v. Ins. Co., 110 Pa. 144:
"When therefore companies of this kind put it in the power of their agents to deliver their
policies, .. , they are estopped from gainsaping the regularity of ... collection" etc. (Italics mine).
28 Sadler's annotation of Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Carter, 8 Sad. 191 (Pa, 1887) ; Landy v.
Ins. Co., 78 Pa. Super. 47 (1921). But see Simpson v. Assurance Soc., 127 Pa. Super. 386, 193 A.
449 (1937). The late Justice Sadler's annotation states that there must be delivery of the policy
to make payment conclusive, relying on the authority of Marland v. insurance Co., 71 Pa. 393,
and Greene v. Insurance Co., 91 Pa. 387. What the Greene case seems to hold is that the mere pos-
session of the policy by the agent is ambiguous, and that it does not per se indicate the extension
of credit to the agent by the company, though it does give the agent authority to collect. The Mar-
land case, while its dicta indicated that credit to the insured was improper, clearly implied that
payment to a broker in the possession of the policy was sufficient without an intimation as to the
necessity of delivery. If Sadler's meaning is that if in fact neither the agent or the company is paid,
then delivery is necessary to estop the company from asserting non-payment, and this is merely the
parol evidence rule of Eaton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 515, Pa. 68, 172 A. 121. 95 A. L. R. 462
(1934). It should also be observed that in the Marland and Greene cases the agent was not in fact
paid, so they do not speak, except as dicta as to the necessity of delivery if the agent were in fact
paid. Simpson v. Assurance Soc. supra, held that a payment to the agent was valid even when
the policy had not been delivered to the agent at the time of payment; the circumstances, however,
may have been special, as they involved an exchange of policies.
29 Here insured, having received the policy from the sub-agent, then went to the agent, and
paid him, but the agent at the time he received the money, expressly disavowed authority to receive
it, and said he "would see what he could do." Hence, in this case there was no reliate on the
agent's possession as authority to receive.
80 Brady v. Masonic Aid Ass'n., 190 Pa. 395, (1899).
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insurance premium is not an illegal inducement or advantage to purchase in-
surance.$1
Credit Theory: General
The credit theory for giving an agent power to collect the premium has been
clearly stated by Judge Orlady in Essington Enamel Co. v. Insurance Co.:
82
"When the usual course of dealing between an insurance company
and its agent is for the company to treat the agent as its debtor for the
premiums on the policies delivered to him (the agent), and to render
bills periodically for them, the payment of the premium by the assured to
the agent is payment to the company: Penna. Ins. Co. v. Ca~rter, 8 Sad.
191; Elkins v. Ins. Co., 113 Pa. 386."
In the Essington case what the court held was that the agent has authority to ex-
tend credit to the insured because the company gave the agent credit; of course, if
the agent may grant the insured his personal credit to effect a policy of insurance,
a fortiori, the agent may receive the premium. Nevertheless, two of the early cases
which refused to endorse the possession theory, sustained payment under the
credit theory.83 In recent decisions, the courts have left the credit theory to sustain
insurance effected by a credit from the agent to the insured, resting the authority
to receive the payment on the possession theory, so that recent citations have been
dicta. 84 In recent years, however, Judge James used the theory to sustain a decision
on workmen's compensation, where it was contended, apparently, that the em-
ployer was not insured because the broker had no power to receive the premium.86
It seems proper, therefore, to consider the credit theory a dead-letter today as far
as sustaining payments to insurance agents is concerned.
In the early cases where credit had been granted to the agent, the courts did not
make much distinction between cases where the insured actually paid the agent,
and those in which the insured had merely been granted the personal credit of the
agent. The idea seems to have been that the credit of the company to the agent was
a kind of inchoate payment to the company, subject to be defeated only by the
31 Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Assurance Co., 278 Pa. 558, 123 A. 497 (1924); Pearl Assur-
ance Co. v. National Ins. Agency, 150 Pa. Super. 265, 28 A.2d 334 (1942).
32 45 Pa. Super. 550 (1911) confirming 20 Dist. 882 (1910).
83 Universal Insurance Co. v, Block, 109 Pa. 535, 1 A. 523 (1895) ; Scott v. Sun Fire Office,
133 Pa. 322, 19 A. 360 (1890).
34 Essington Enamel Co. v. Ins. Co., 45 Pa. Super. 550 (1911); Krebs v. Tomlinson, 12
D. & C. 126 (1929) ; Adams v. Brandon, 111 Pa. Super. 471, 170 A. 391 (1934).
38 Adams v. Brandon, 111 Pa. Super. 471, 170 A. 391 (1934).
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insured's not paying the agent in "usual course of business."38 Once the company
gave the credit to the agent, it might be said that the court treated the policy
as paid in the eyes of the company, subject to be defeated only if the insured "aban-
doned" the policy, that is, if the insured was unusually "irregular" or dilatory
in paying the agent.87 Under such a view it is idle to talk about the agent's authority
to receive from the insured or to give credit to the insured; such things do not really
matter. What has happened is that the agent has volunteered to pay the insurance,
although this payment is only by credit. But it is doubtful if the courts intended
to push their views this far, for they stress the idea that the insured must pay
in "the usual course of business." Credit to the agent is therefore not to be intented
as a payment to the company but only as a power to receive or to give a "short
credit" to the insured.
Part Payment
It has been held that there may be part payment of the premium on the policy
where the policy is delivered by the agent. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Clark,38
the insured paid the agent two-thirds of the premium by his note (which is proper)
and assumed the debt of the agent to a stranger for the other one-third of the pre-
mium. Such assumption of an agent's debt was held to be an illegal rebate by
the agent. Therefore, the insurance company could not sue for the full premium,
but only for one-third of the premium (the agent had absconded with the other
two-thirds) involved in the illegal rebate.
WHERE THE AGENT PAYS THE COMPANY BUT THE INSURED
DOES NOT PAY THE AGENT
As we have already observed, dicta in many of the early cases indicated that
the grant of credit to the agent was payment by the insured.38 Several recent cases,
86 "Estopped from gainsaying the regularity of the method . . . for collection," Riley v.
Ins. Co.. 110 Pa. 144. 1 A. 528 (1885); "established course of dealing," Lebanon Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Hoover, 113 Pa. 591, 8 A. 163, 57 Am. St. Rep. 511 (1886); Penna. Ins. Co, v. Carter,
8 Sad. 101 (Pa. 1887); "due course of husness," "ordinary course of buiness," "paid in the
usual way," "given in the usual manner," Pittsburgh Boat-Yard Co. v. Assurance Co., 118 Pa. 415,
11 A., 801 (1888); -adopted a course of dealing," Elkins v. Ins. Co., 124 Pa. 484, 17 A. 24, 10
Am. St. Rep. 608 (1889); "charge against agent . . . ;may be treated . . . (as) payment between
the (insured) and the company" (defining conditions), Willey v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 77 Fed. 961 (W.
D. Pa., 1897) confirmed 80 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 3 Cir., 1897) ; "the course of dealing was well
established so that the policy became a binding contract upon its delivery at the latest,- Essington
Enamel Co. v. Ins. Co., 45 Pa. Super. 550 (1911); "the course of dealing constituted payment
to the (company)," Proudley v. Fid. and Guar. Corp., 345 Pa. 385, 29 A.2d 48 (1923).
37 E. G., Peretzman v. Ins. Co., 258 Pa. 319, 102 A. 22 (1917).
38 62 Pa. Super. 528 (1916).
39 See note 36, ante. See also Marland v. Ins. Co., 71 Pa. 393 (1872); Universal Ins. Co., v.
Block, 109 Pa. 535, 1 A. 523 (1885) ; Elkins v. Ins. Co., 112 Pa. 386, 6 A. 224 (1886) ; Scott v.
Sun Fire Office, 133 Pa. 322, 19 A. 360 (1890) ; Snyder v. Ins. Co., 202 Pa, 01, 51 A. 744 (1902).
Contra: see discussion of illegality of credit in the text, infra.
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also, have directly ruled that the agent may volunteer payment of the pr'emium in be-
half of the insured and that such payment is conclusive as against the company.
40
Argument in Favor of Volunteer Payments by Agent
It is possible that the promise of an agent to make payments for the insured
and grant the insured credit therefor would be an illegal inducement to purchase
insurance under the statutes previously set forth. 41 But even if such promise to grant
credit is illegal, the illegality does not touch the relation between the insured and
the company, for without actual knowledge by the company of the promise the
agent is to them a mere remitter. And even if the insurance company is made a
party to the promise to grant credit, it is doubtful whether, after payment has been
made, the company will be permitted to defend on the maxim in pari delicto porior
est conditio defendentis for the purpose of denying the payment or avoiding the
policy. The reason why rebates and favors to insured persons are made illegal in-
ducements is that they tend to deplete the treasury of the insurance company (as
will be discussed at length in the text hereinafter); consquently, when the com-
pany has actually been paid, there is no reason why the law should permit thL de-
fense of illegality. Ratione cessante, lex etiam cessat. And lastly, the cases actually
hold that such a payment is good, even if the insured must ratify a forgery to take
advantage of it.42
WHERE THE AGENT DOES NOT PAY THE COMPANY AND THE COMPANY
DOES NOT PAY THE AGENT
Despite the presence in the policy of "prepayment" or "lapse on non-payment"
clauses accompanied by "no waiver by any agent" clauses, as explained above, it has
been held that the insured may buy his insurance on the credit of the agent when
the company has given the agent authority to effect the insurance on the personal
credit of the agent, even though the company has not in fact been paid. Such auth-
40 Farmers' & Breeders' Mut. Ins. Co., v. Derr, 59 Pa. Super. 600 (1915) (Although the
company may defend on a suit for the cancellation refund by reason of the fact that the payment
by the agent was an "illegal inducement," the insurance is effective.) ; Krebs v. Tomlinson, 12 D.
& C. 26 (1929); American Casualty Co. v. Keator, 24 D. & C. 225 (1935) (if, under a con-
fused state of facts, one finds the company was paid by the agent) ; Proudley v. Fid. & Guar. Fire
Corporation, 345 Pa. 385, 29 A.2d 48 (1943) (payment by credit to agent); infantino v. Ins. Co.,
159 Pa. Super. 454, 48 A.2d 87 (1946).
41 See note 4, supra, for text of statute. Discussion of illegality is in text, infra.
42 Proudley v. Fid. & Guar. Fire Corp., 345 Pa. 385, 29 A.2d 48 (1943) ; Infantino v. Ins.
Co., 159 Pa. Super. 454, 48 A.2d. 87 (1946). White v. Ins. Co., 22 Pa. Super. 501 (1903) and
Thomas v. Assurance Corp., 284 Pa. 129, 130 A. 322 (1925) hold than an insurance company has
waived a defense where it has retained payment for an unreasonable length of time without in-
forming the insured of its intention not to waive the defense, even though such waiver of defense
is contrary to the written terms of the policy, and thus violates the parol evidence rule. These
last two cases lend support to the view that an insurance company is estopped from asserting that
the insured did not pay the premium if it knowingly accepts payment from a volunteer. The ques-
tion remains whether the company should be charged with knowledge from the time it receives pay-
ment from its agent, or only from the time the company actually discovers that the payment was
volunteered.
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ority is presumed from the fact that the company granted credit to the agent. 43
And likewise, such credit to the agent from the company is presumed from the
possession of the policy by the agent. 44 If, despite these presumptions, it is establish-
ed that in fact the agent did not have such authority, then the insured may still
assert the effectiveness of the insurance by reason of credit from the agent, if he
reasonably thought that the agent had authority to effect the insurance on his per-
sonal credit, or if he reasonably thought the agent had paid the premium. 45 It is
reasonable for the insured to suppose that the agent has the authority to effect
the insurance by credit when:
46
(I) The agent has possession of the policy, and
(2) The insured knows of the possession by the agent, and
(3) By reason of the possession of the policy by the agent, the insured sup-
poses that the agent has either paid the company or been granted credit
by it, and
(4) The insured cannot be charged with knowledge that the agent had not
in fact either paid the premium or been granted credit by the company.
The whole problem boils down to this: what should the law do when the
following dialogue takes place between agent and insured:
Agent: Your policy has been approved by the company, and I have your
policy here. When would you like to pay the premium and receive the
policy?
Insured: Well, I would like to be insured right away, but I am a little
press'ed right now for money. Will I be insured if I wait to pay you next
week?
Agent: Your insurance will be all right to then; you pay me next week
sometime.
43 Elkins v. Ins. Co., 113 Pa. 386, 6 A. 163 (1886); Essington Enamel Co., v. Ins. Co.
45 Pa. Super. 550 (1911); Ellis v. Anderson, 49 Pa. Super. 245 (1912). Contra: Marland v.
Ins. Co., 71 Pa. 393 (1872).
44 Marland v. Ins. Co., 71 Pa. 393 (1872); Pennsylvania Ins. Co., v. Carter, 8 Sad. 191
(Pa. 1887); Essington Enamel Co., v. Ins. Co., 45 Pa. Super. 550 (1911); Ellis v. Anderson, 49
Pa. Super. 245 (1912); Universal Ins. Co. v. Block, 109 Pa. 535, 1 A. 523 (1885) ; Snyder v. Ins.
Co., 202 Pa. 161, 51 A. 744 (1902). Contra: Pottsville Ins. Co. v. Improvement Co., 100 Pa.
137 (1882) ; the lack of authority of this case should be noted from the discussion in the text, ante.
45 Essington Enamel Co. v. Ins. Co., 45 Pa. Super. 550 (1911).
46 No case has put forth the requirements as they are listed here; in fact no case has made
a careful distinction between proof of actual authority and apparent authority. But one can express
the general "feeling" of the cases, which is what is done here. The Pennsylvania cases, and particu-
larly the early cases, speak rather the language of proof of actual authority than of apparent auth.
ority; they almost indicate that the law will uphold insurance by credit only where a finding of
actual authority can be sustained under the facts. See the following cases for such intimations as
exist on this subject: Marland v. Ins. Co., 71 Pa. 393 (1872); Riley v. Ins. Co., 110 Pa. 144, 1 A. 528
(1895); Elkins v. Ins. Co., 113 Pa. 386, 6 A. 224 (1886); Lebanon Ins. Co. v. Hoover, 113 Pa.
591, 8 A. 163 (1886) ; Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Carter, 8 Sad. 181 (Pa. 1887) ; Pittsburgh Boat-Yard
Co. v. Ins. Co., 118 Pa. 415, 11 A. 801 (1888).
It is worth noting the broad statement of the court in Essington Enamel Co. v. Ins. Co., 45 Pa.
Super. 550 (1911) that actual authority is not required: "The question is not so much what auth-
ority the agent had in point of fact, as it is what powers a third party dealing with him had the
right to suppose he possessed, judging from his acts and the acts of his principal."
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Or when the insured receives the policy from the agent with this letter:
"Enclosed find the insurance policies you requested. As these policies
are immediately effective, may we urge upon you to give us prompt notice
of any cancellations you may wish to make, for we will have to bill you
for any premiums due up until the time we receive notice. Your prompt
payment of the premiums due on the policies herein will be greatly ap-
preciated."
Or suppose that the insured obtains his insurance through a broker who bills his
clients only at quarterly periods without regard to when a particular policy may be
effected?
Is the only remedy of the insured against the agent personally for breach of
promise by the agent to pay the insurance for the insured, or for deceit for leading
the insured to believe that the premium had been paid by the agent, or that the
company had given the agent credit therefor? Does not the company by constituting
persons agents for it mean that they ought to stand up behind the representations
and actions of their agents in such circumstances?
Here the insured goes blithely on his way thinking he is insured because the
agent told him "it would be taken care of," only to have the company inform him
after a loss occurs that he is not insured because "we didn't get the money from
the agent." The insured cannot know whether the agent has paid the company, or
has been given credit by it, or has been given authority to give credit to the insured;
and if the agent leads the insured to believe that any one of these things has been
done, is not the company responsible for that representation? This writer believes
that the insurance company is responsible. As regards an insurance broker, it re-
mains in each case to establish how far he is an agent of the company, or is supposed
by the insured to be an agent of the company.
It is of course equally necessary in this situation to establish the actual grant
of credit to the insured by the agent as it is to establish the authority of the agent
to grant credit. Cases which seem to deny the possibility of waiving the "prepay-
ment" clause seem to this writer to have been actually decided on the absence
of a grant of credit to the insured.' 7 Of course the fact of delivery of the policy to
the insured is highly probative of a grant of credit to the insured,48 as the absence
of a delivery to the insured is probative of the absence of any credit.' 9 Perhaps
the delivery of the policy (without an acknowledgement of payment of the premium
thereon) creates a presumption that credit has been granted to the insured.0 And
47 For example, Schaffer v. Ins. Co., 89 Pa. 279 (1878); Greene v. Ins. Co., 91 Pa. 387
(1879); and Harrisburg Trust Co. v. Ins. Co., 278 Pa. 255, 122 A. 292 (1923).
48 Landy v. Ins. Co. 78 Pa. Super. 47 (1921); Harrisburg Trust Co. v. Ins. Co., 278 Pa.
255, 122 A. 292 (1923).
49 Roseberry v. Ins. Co., 120 Pa. Super. 450, 183 A. 121 (1936).
60 Universal Ins. Co. v. Block, 109 Pa. 535, 1 A. 523, (1886), Pennsylvania Ins. Co., v.
Carter, 8 Sad. 191 (Pa. 1887); Essington Enamel Co. v. Ins. Co., 45 Pa. Super. 550 (1911);
Snyder v. Ins. Co., 202 Pa. 161, 51 A. 744 (1902). The earliest cases intimate that the fact of
delivery is necessary to establish credit from the agent to the insured: Marland v. Ins. Co., 71 Pa.
393 (1872); Schaffer v. Ins. Co., 89 Pa. 279 (1878); Greene v. Ins. Co., 91 Pa. 387 (1879).
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where the policy delivered contains an acknowledgement of the payment of the
premium, a problem in estoppel is raised which will be considered in detail infra.
One situation which requires notice is in regard to subsequent premiums,
where the insured has previously made late payments of premiums through his
agent, and not being informed of any lapse, has been led to believe by the con-
tinued acceptance of his premiums without protest, that the agent is either paying
the premiums, or that the company is granting credit to the agent; and that if the
insurance were overdue again, the company would look to the agent as it had in the
past for payment of the premium. The courts have not treated the insured with much
favor in such circumstances, 51 except where the facts involve the thirty day grace
period and/or failure to send a premium notice; 62 and the thirty-day grace period
in regard to life insurance policies is now a statutory requirement. 63
In the citation of cases upon the problem of credit, the reader must remember
the many possibilities of opinion which are open to the court, and the difficulty
of determining which nuance, if any, the court is insisting upon."4 Probably more
important than that is to try to see what result the courts are trying to achieve.
51 Washington Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Rosenberger, 84 Pa. 374 (1877).
52 Girard Life Ins. Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 86 Pa. 236 (1878) ; Helme v. Phila. Life
Ins. Co., 61 Pa. 107 (1869).
53 For life and endowment policies: Act of 1945, P. L. 334, sec. 1 (sec. 401 (b) of the
insurance regulation act, 40 P. S. 510 (b),), first enacted 1911, P. L. 581, sec. 25 (2). For an-
nuities and pure endowments: Act of 1935, P. L. 1116, sec. I (Sec. 410B (b) of the insurance
regulations act, 40 P. S. 510A (b).)
64 For example, the court may hold these several views in regard to the problems involved:
A. The agent's authority to grant credit to the insured is:
(1) necessary;
(2) necessary and may be presumed;
(3) not necessary but must be apparent to the insured.
B. Delivery of the policy to the agent by the company:
(1) is necessary to show credit from the company to the agent;
(2) creates a presumption of credit from the company to the agent;
(3) is sufficient payment by the insured;
(4) presumes that the agent has authority to grant credit to the insured;
(5) in se gives the agent power to grant credit to the insured.
C. Credit to the agent:
(1) is necessary to the agent's authority to grant credit to the insured;
(2) creates a presumption that the agent has authority to grant credit to the insured;
(3) in se gives the agent power to grant credit to the insured.
D. Delivery to the insured:
(1) is necessary to establish a credit to the insured by the agent;
(2) creates a presumption that the agent has granted credit to the insured;
(3) when there is an acknowledgement on the policy or premium receipt of pay.
ment of the premium, this estops the company from denying effectiveness of
the insurance but not from denying the payment in order to recover the pre-
mium;
(4) where there is an acknowledgement on the policy or premium receipt of pay-
ment of the premium, this estops the company from denying the effectiveness
of the insurance and also from denying the payment in order to recover the
premium.
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Estoppel by Delivery of Receipted Policy or of Premium Receipt
A receipt according to the early cases seems to have been conclusive between
the insurance company and the insured both as to the effectiveness of the policy
and the fact of payment in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, especially as
to third persons." Howvever, there were negative indications in other cases. It
seems that the insured cannot claim delivery through a sub-agent where the insured
knows when he receives delivery that the agent would not part with possession
of the policy without actual payment;" or where the receipt for the policy expressly
states that the delivery is conditional;6 7 or where the insured has paid for the in-
surance with a check drawn on insufficient funds. 8 And there is dicta to the effect
that although the delivery by the agent may estop the agent from denying payment,
it does not estop the Company from denying payment.59
More recent cases seem to have drawn the distinction between estoppel in re-
gard to denying effectiveness of insurance and in regard to denying payment of
the premium in order to collect the delinquent premium, holding that the company
is not estopped for the purposes of the latter.60 The Hon. T. McKeen Chidsey,
present Attorney General of the Commonwealth, in the Master's Report he made,
reported in Thomas v. Charles Baker and Co.,6 1 held directly on both points; that
the defendant was insured by reason of tstoppel, but that defendant nevertheless
had to pay the premium because the estoppel did not prevent a suit for the pre-
mium. Likewise, tht doctrine of Real Estate Co. v. Rudolph 2 does not prevent
the company's asserting non-payment, despite the receipt, for the purpose of collect-
ing the premium, for that case holds that the defendant is estopped to assert want
of consideration by reason of non-payment.
However, it seems that Eaton v. New York Life Insurance Co.63 has changed
this rule and that the company is not estopped by a delivery of a receipt from assert-
ing the invalidity of te policy by reason of non-payment. Especially in the face of an
admission by the insured that the premium was not paid.64 The reasoning of Eaton
v. Insurance Co., supra, was that where the delivery was conditional upon pay-
ment, both the condition of payment and the fact of non-payment may be shown by
parol; yet of course, the decision adds that by reason of the parol evidence rule the
55 Riley v. Ins. Co., 110 Pa. 144, 1 A. 528 (1885); Lebanon Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Erb,
112 Pa. 149, 4 A. 8 (1886); Willey v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 77 Fed. 961 (W. D. Pa., 1897); idem
on appeal, affirmed 80 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 3 Cir., 1897) ; Sargeant v. Ins. Co., 189 Pa. 341, 41 A.
351 (1899); Atkins v. Payne, 190 Pa. 5 (1899); Essington Enamel Co. v. Ins. Co. 45 Pa. Super.
550 (1911); possibly also Gosch v. Ins. Co., 33 Pa. Super. 496 (1907).
56 Flynn v. Ins. Co., 4 Pa. Super. 137 (1897).
5'7 Gordon Y. Ins. Co., 231 Pa. 404, 80 A. 882 (1911).
68 Brady v. Masonic Aid As'n., 190 Pa. 595 (1899).
59 Gosch v. Ins. Co., 33 Pa. Super. 496 (1907).
60 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 62 Pa. Super. 528 (1916) ; Thomas v. Charles Baker & Co.,
60 F.2d 1057 (E. D. Pa., 1932).
61 60 F.2d 1057 (E. D. Pa., 1932).
02 301 Pa. 502, 153 A. 438 (1930).
63 315 Pa. 68, 172 A. 121, 95 A. L. R. 462 (1934).
64 Shook v. Ins. Co., 343 Pa. 185, 22 A.2d 647 (1941).
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receipt when delivered prevents the showing of non-payment by parol. The reason-
ing to this writer seems self-contradictory. If the parol evidence rule is to be ap-
plied to insurance receipts, the fact in the receipt, (using the late Judge Reese's dis-
tinction between facts in and facts of) viz., payment, is the onL- condition of delivery
which may not be shown by parol. In Van Dusen v. New York Life Insurance Co.,65
the federal court ignored the part of the opinion of Eaton v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
supra, about delivery being conditional on payment and applied, approving the
case, the part of the opinion concerning tle parol evidence rule, thus preventing
the company from showing non-payment. In Corrigan v. Home Life Insurance Co.,08
decided after Eaton v. Insurance Co., supra, the Superior Court held that the re-
ceipt book of a ten-cent a week policy estopped the company from asserting the
invalidity of the policy by reason of non-payment.
It seems, therefore, that if a definite answer is to be given as to whether the
insurance company is estopped from asserting non-payment when payment is a
condition of the delivery, further litigation will be required, despite the application
of the doctrine of Eaton v. Insurance Co., supra, in a later Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case.67
Credit for Insurance Premiums as an Illegal Inducement
Until the passage of the Act of 1909, P. L. 405, 40 P. S. 275, as amended, it
was uniformly held that the agent might lawfully grant credit to the insured.
Then came the decision of Ellis v. Anderson6s in which Judge Porter held that it
was not an illegal inducement for an agent or insurance company to receive pay-
ment by an interest-bearing legal obligation. If the opinion had stopped there, it
would be of no particular significance, but Judge Porter went on to say that the Act
of 1909 "works a decided change in insurance law" (p. 252), and that it was
only because the act was a penal one and required strict construction (p. 253) that
permitted him to decide that payment by an interest-bearing legal obligation was
not an illegal inducement. "The result (of liberal construction) would be, in short,
to put it out of the power of an insurance company to waive the benefit of any
covenant of the policy or of the assured to assert such waiver." (p. 254)
The Act of 1895, P. L. 430, Sec. 1, applied to life insurance only, whereas
the Act of i909, P. L. 405 applied to all insurance.69 Under the previous act, it
65 21 F. Supp. 375 (M. D. Pa., 1937).
66 120 Pa. Super. 476, 183 A. 125 (1936).
67 Shook v. Ins. Co., 343 Pa. 185, 22 A.2d 647 (1941).
68 49 Pa. Super. 245 (1912).
69 It is not worth trying the reader's patience by tracing in detail all the legislative transforma.
lions of the illegal inducement statutes. Suffice it to say that the language became more specific
with succeeding statutes. The Act of 1889, P. L. 118 applied to life insurance only. The Act of 1895,
P. L. 430 made it illegal to receive an inducement as well as illegal to give one for life insurance.
The Act of 1909, P. L. 405 was made to apply to all insurance. The Act of 1913, P. L. 745 simpli.
fied the text and permitted interest.bearing legal obligations to be made lawful payment for pre-
miums. The Act of 1921, P. L. 789, sec. 635, 636 (page 816) removed the prohibition from com-
panies to give "inducements" for insurance and limited the prohibition to "agents, solicitors, or
brokers"; it is still illegal for any one to receive an inducement.
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had not occurred to the courts that credit in case of life insurance was illegal by rea-
son of the act.69a The immediate effect of the decision of Ellis v, Anderson, supra,
was to cause the assembly to revise the act and to permit the payment of insurance
premiums by "bona-fide obligations, with legal interest."69b
There are persuasive reasons why the extension of credit to the insured by the
agent should be held an illegal inducement. As Judge Porter states them:
"The things which are in the sentence (the Act of 1909) specifically en-
umerated are such as directly tend to deplete the treasury of the insurance
company, thus giving a rebate of the premium....
"If this defendant had paid his notes when they came due, the insur-
ance company would have had in its treasury the full premium on the
policy, with interest thereon to the date of the payment. This being the
case, it cannot be said that the company had agreed to accept less than
the amount of the premium named in the policy....
"The statute as we have already said does not require insurance pre-
miums to be paid in advance .... In the absence of any such prohibition
or regulation this plaintiff and the company which he represented had
the discretion ordinarily exercised by those engaged in business to ex-
tend credit to persons whom they believed to be financially responsible."
(p. 255, 256)
In other words, the public policy of the act is to favor sound insurance companies
who deal with all members of the public on a basis of equality. Credit is therefore
an illegal inducement because it is unlikely that there will be one hundred per cent
collection where credit is granted; but if interest is required where credit is grant-
ed, this risk is equalized, and the equality between cash and credit buyers of insur-
ance is maintained.
It remains also to be considered whether, even if the company cannot grant
credit to the insured, the agent should be permitted to grant credit to the
insured, if the company has granted credit to the agent. The insured has no way
of knowing the state of accounts between the agent and the company, and if the
company chooses to grant credit to the agent, is there any public policy that says
the insured must pay the agent? It is not the agent whom the law seeks to protect
but the company and the general public.
All the cases which have considered the Act of 1909 or its successors have
agreed that credit is an illegal inducement. 0 But in other cases the courts have sus-
tained the effectiveness of a policy purchased by credit from the agent without dis-
69a Snyder v. Ins. Co., 202 Pa. 161, 51 A. 744 (1902). In Sargeant v. Ins. Co., 189 Pa. 341,
where it was decided that the insured had committed suicide, and where the company also offered
to show the inconclusiveness of a receipt for premiums, the question of illegal inducement by credit
if the receipt had been conclusive was not raised.
69b Act of 1913, P. L. 745 (See note 4 for text as incorporated in Act of 1921, P. L. 789,
Sec. 635).
70 Farmers' & Breeders' Mutual Ins. Co., v. Derr, 59 Pa. Super. 639 (1915); Landy v.
Ins. Co., 78 Pa. Super. 47 (1921) ; Harrisburg Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co., 278 Pa. 255, 122 A. 292
(1923); Hirsch v. Singer, 86 Pa. Super. 605 (1926); Katchmer v. Ins. Co., 325 Pa. 69, 73, 188
A. 869 (1937) ; Shook v. Life Ins. Co., 343 Pa. 185, 22 A.2d 647 (1941).
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cussing the question of illegality;7 1 apparently the courts will not be astute to find
illegality. In those cases which have held credit to be an illegal inducement, many of
them are not thoroughly considered or of limited authority. In Harrisburg Trust
Co. v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.2 the case was primarily decided on the fact that
an insurance broker was not the agent of the insured to receive the policy (but
an agent of the company to deliver) and so the company was not estopped to deny
payment by reason of delivery; nor without the fact of delivery was there sufficient
evidence to establish a credit to the insured. Hence the argument of illegal induce-
ment through credit was mostly a fortiori. Further, Mr. Justice Schaffer relied on
the authority of Marland v. Insurance Co."2 for the ruling that credit was an illegal
inducement, and although there is language in the case implying that credit to the
insured is never permissible in any circumstances, when carefully read the case can-
not be considered to hold more than that the bare possession of the policy by the
agent is not such apparent authority in the agent to grant credit to the insured that
the insured may rely on it (for it was shown as a matter of fact that the company
had granted no credit to the agent, and that the agent had no authority to grant
credit to the insured).
In Farmers' and Breeders', etc., Ins. Co. v. Derr74 it was held that illegality
of the agent's grant of credit would prevent the insured from suing the company
for the refund upon cancellation even though this illegality did not, in the opinion
of the court, affect the validity of the insurance. In Landy v. Insurance Co. 5 it was
held that even though the company had granted credit to its agent, it could assert
that the policy was not paid by the subsequent grant of credit to the insured by the
agent, because this was an illegal inducement. However, it was doubtful whether
in this case credit had been granted to the insured by the agent, and on the witness
stand the agent denied that the insured had received credit. In Hirsch v. Singer76 the
force of the entire statute was largely destroyed by a holding that it was true that a
non-interest-bearing legal obligation was an illegal inducement, nevertheless an
oral obligation to pay the agent would be presumed to be agreed to be interest-bear-
ing if there was no evidence to the contrary. Such a ruling, if enforced, would vitiate
the entire statute. Incidentally, it was held in Krebs v. Tomlinson.77 that an inter-
est-bearing negotiable instrument was not an illegal inducement. In consideration
of the weakness of these decisions there is still considerable question as to whether
the grant of credit to the insured by the agent is an illegal inducement.
71 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 62 Pa. Super. 528 (1916) ; Thomas v. Charles Baker & Co., 60
F.2d 1057 (E. D. Pa., 1932); Corrigan v. Life Ins. Co., 120 Pa. Super. 476, 183 A. 125 (1936);
Van Dusen v. Life Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 375 (M. D. Pa., 1937); Proudley v. Fid. & Guar. Corp.,
345 Pa. 385, 29 A.2d 48 (1943). Credit denied; illegality not argued: Eaton v. Life Ins. Co., 315
Pa. 68, 172 A. 121, 97 A. L. R. 462 (1934).
72 278 Pa. 255, 122 A. 292 (1923).
'78 71 Pa. 393 (1872).
74 59 Pa. Super. 639 (1915).
7/5 78 Pa. Super. 47 (1921).
76 86 Pa. Super. 605 (1926).
77 2 D. & C. 126 (1929).
PAYMENT OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS....
lllegality of Credit in Relation To Life Insurance
As the reader will recall, there is a statute which requires the presence in every
policy of life insurance of a clause which requires the prepayment of premiums.7 8
The court called upon this statute in support of its decision in Harrisburg Trust Co.
v. Mulual Life Ins. Co., supra. The reader will recall from our analysis of this case
that the decision rested mostly on the fact that no credit had been granted to the
insured. Although the Harrisburg Trust case was cited in Katchmer 1'. Life Ins.
Co.79 and Sbook v. Life Ins. Co.80 those later cases did not mention the Act of
1921, P. L. 682, Sec. 410 (a) or its successors. It has been held that the Act does not
require the beneficiary of the insured to produce a receipt as a condition of his re-
covery under the policy, but that oral proof of payment may be admitted.8 ' It was
also held that where the policy did not specifically mention whether the premiums
were to be paid in advance or not, then the statute must be read into the policy.81a
This writer is unable to see why the statute requiring the presence of a prepay-
ment clause in life insurance policies should cause the clause to receive a different
interpretation from those insurance policies where the clause is present but no statute
requires its presence. The requirement of the presence of a clause in a contract is
not a prohibition of its waiver under reasonable circumstances.
Effect of Parol Evidence Rule on Illegality of Credit for Premium
If the law prohibits and will not recognize credit granted by the agent to the
insured for an insurance premium, will this prohibition stand against the paro
evidence rule? Or, will a person be permitted to establish illegality by means of
parol evidence to defeat the parol evidence rule? P. Y. R. in a note in 12 TEMPLE
LAW QUARTERLY 413 criticizing the ruling in Van Dusen v. New York Life In-
surance Co.82 argues that the mandatory presence of a "prepayment" clause in the
policy requires not only actual payment of the premium before the policy shall be
effective, but that the rule announced in Eaton v. Life Insurance Co.88 that a de-
livered receipt cannot be contradicted by parol, must be set aside to permit the
showing of non-payment of premium in order to carry out the public policy of the
statute8 ' P. Y. R. observes that Eaton v. Insurance Co. supsra, was construing a
New York contract, but this case has always been treated by bench and bar as a
statement of the Pennsylvania law. Arid the Federal District Court followed the
rule of the Eaton case in the case criticized by P. Y. R. What the ruling would
be if the matter were directly presented to the courts is problematical.
78 See note 4, supra.
79 325 Pa. 69, 73, 188 A. 869 (1937).
80 343 Pa. 185, 22 A.2d 647 (1941).
81 Badurka v. Life Ins. Co., 99 Pa. Super. 26 (1930) ; Klopik v. Life Ins. Co., 155 Pa. Super.
659, 39 A.2d 281 (1944).
81a Browne v. Life Ins. Co., 119 Pa. 222 (1935).
82 21 F. Supp. 375 (M. D. Pa., 1937).
88 315 Pa. 68, 172 A. 121, 95 A. L. R. 462 (1934).
84 P. Y. R. cites Act of 1935, P. L. 1116 -which applies to "annuity and pure endowment
policies" and which contains only a provision in regard to the thirty-day grace period, but does not
contain the clause requiring prepayment of all premiums. The text proceeds as if P. Y. R. were
discussing Act of 1935, P. L. 1020, sec. I (sec. 410 (a) of the insurance regulation act).
